The problem with the Spitzenkandidaten system. CEPS Commentary, 21 February 2018 by Russack, Sophia
 21 February 2018 
 
Sophia Russack is Researcher in the Institutions unit of CEPS. 
CEPS Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues in European affairs. As 
an institution, CEPS takes no official position on questions of EU policy. The views expressed are 
attributable only to the author and not to any institution with which she is associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu)  © CEPS 2018 
CEPS ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu 
The problem with the Spitzenkandidaten system  
Sophia Russack 
The lead candidate, or so-called Spitzenkandidaten procedure, is posing something of a conundrum 
to its proponents. Its core problem – namely that member states do not buy into it – won’t be 
solved by any of the reform ideas that have recently been floated. In all likelihood, Heads of State 
and Government will grudgingly agree to continue the process in the European Parliament (EP) 
elections in 2019. But crucially they will not promote it towards their citizens, which is necessary if 
the system is to work. 
The experience of 2014  
The procedure to appoint the President of the European Commission was turned on its head in 
2014. Instead of backroom dealing among European leaders, as before, European voters could 
determine the head of the EU’s executive from among candidates pre-selected by the EP’s political 
groups.1 In a rather clever manoeuvre, the European Parliament launched the lead candidate 
system by exploiting the vague wording of the Lisbon Treaty on this point, which prescribes that 
the European Council take “into account the elections to the European Parliament” (Article 17(7) 
TEU). By publicly branding this system as the most democratic way to proceed, in political terms it 
forced the Heads of States and Governments to act on it. When introducing the lead candidate 
process, the hope was that this would raise citizens’ awareness and interest in European issues and 
elections – ultimately drawing more of them to the ballot box to counteract the constant downward 
slide in voter turnout at EP elections.  
Despite this initiative, voter turnout at the 2014 EP elections hit an all-time low. Since the first direct 
election in 1979, turnout has gradually fallen from about 62% to 42.61%.2 In 2014, it was even lower 
than before the new system, in the elections of 2009. The Commission made the point that 
although the downward trend was not arrested, the system had nevertheless “helped in stemming 
its fall” – but a less sharp decline can hardly be presented as achievement.  
The experiment showed that the lead candidates remained largely unknown to citizens in member 
states. European Commission research on previous EP elections suggests that national parties have 
                                                     
1 Indirectly, as the candidate still needs to be approved by a majority in both the European Council and European 
Parliament (Article 17(7) TEU).  
2 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html.  
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made little effort to promote EU topics and elections and that the link between national and EU 
party politics has been weak.3 The German case is exemplary here: the Christian Democrats posted 
Angela Merkel’s face on the campaign billboards even though she was not a candidate. How can 
the lead candidate system raise awareness if people don’t even know who is standing for election? 
It is not unknown that national players make the EP election about themselves; the lead candidate 
system does not seem to have changed that.  
In the same vein, an in-house study by the EP revealed that only 5% of voters in 2014 indicated that 
to “influence the choice of the President of the European Commission” was the main motivation 
behind their vote.4 This is hardly surprising because the lead candidate process came into being 
rather hurriedly and was clearly beset by teething troubles. The election campaign was an immature 
one that allowed little time to create visibility for the candidates or the election itself. 
Prospect for 2019 
Member states still appear to be unconvinced by the lead candidate process. French President 
Macron (although usually keen to introduce more democracy into the EU machinery) is on record 
as saying that it allows the big European party families a power that was traditionally exercised by 
elected national leaders in the European Council. Informally, his opposition probably comes from 
the fact that this procedure is likely to allocate the post to a member of one of the big traditional 
parties.  
Social-democratic leaders in member states fear that conservatives would gain the Commission 
president post because the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) are traditionally the runners-up at EP 
level and their national counterparts have been in steady decline in national elections around 
Europe. Even conservative leaders hold objections because they see this system as a European 
Parliament power grab and would prefer to nominate the Commission president in the European 
Council.  
For their part, the European Commission5 and the European Parliament6 support the lead candidate 
procedure for the upcoming elections in 2019. The Parliament even announced that it would not 
accept any candidate who did not run as a lead candidate. As in 2014, in this institutional turf war, 
reluctant Heads of State and Government seem to have little political room to deviate from it.  
It is simply easier to make a public case for than against the lead candidate system – in the name 
of democracy.  
                                                     
3 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0206&from=EN. 
4 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/eurobarometre/2014/post/post_2014_survey_analitical_overview_en.pdf 
5 In its Communication “A Europe that delivers: Institutional options for making the European Union's work more 
efficient”: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-institutional-options-for-
making-the-european-union-work-more-efficient_en.pdf. 
6 In its Report on the Revision of the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and 
the European Commission: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2018-0006+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
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Its intrinsic problem 
The main problem with the lead candidate system is the disconnect between the EU and its citizens. 
Discussion about the system does not take place at the level intended: it is largely a debate among 
political elites. The ambition was for more democracy, but in fact most citizens have never even 
heard of the term Spitzenkandidaten. The fact that it is (so far) coined in German does not help its 
communication across the EU. Only with sufficient public outreach can the lead candidate system 
boost democratic legitimacy.  
Citizens do not seem to be more aware or more interested in EP elections since the lead candidate 
system came into being, or in the fact that they have a say in who will be the next European 
Commission president. The lead candidate procedure, as with all institutional reform ideas, is not 
an end in itself. It does not provide added value as such; it must deliver concrete results. 
Some of the system’s fledgling setbacks from 2014 can be addressed in the next run, with more 
time. To create more genuinely ‘European’ and less second-order national elections, several things 
need to be done, which were outlined by the Commission on February 14th.7 First, encourage the 
political party groups to select their lead candidates and kick off the election campaigns earlier, to 
allow more time for voters to familiarise themselves with the process and the candidates. Early 
selection could allow for intensive campaigning of the lead candidates across the EU, ideally in all 
member states.8 Second, improve the visibility of the link between European party families and 
their national counterparts, to make people understand that this is not about national politics. In 
this vein, national parties should boost the profile of candidate MEPs, not just their national MPs 
or leaders. Third, trigger the public transmission of political debates across all member states to 
make the elections, topics and candidates more known to voters.  
Efforts to improve the system are legitimate, but expectations must be managed. There is only so 
much the EU institutions can do. Most of these reform ideas address national governments or 
national parties. Their role as facilitator is crucial to generate serious and robust outreach to the 
citizens. This comes back to a systemic problem: if the lead candidate system continues, it will be 
based on political pressure (from the Commission and the European Parliament) – not on the true 
willingness of member states. And how can support for that system and the promotion of it vis-à-
vis citizens be expected of leaders if they don’t back it? This is the intrinsic conundrum of the lead 
candidate system. It is also the reason why, despite the increased promotional efforts of EU 
stakeholders, it will probably make little difference to the 2019 elections. 
                                                     
7 In the same Communication: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-
institutional-options-for-making-the-european-union-work-more-efficient_en.pdf. 
8 European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC): https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/sites/epsc/files/epsc_-_road_to_sibiu_-
_building_on_the_spitzenkandidaten_model.pdf. 
